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This paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model 
emphasizes four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture 
capital funds and search for investment opportunities, entrepreneurial effort and venture 
capital advice during the start-up period, and introduction of new goods by successful start-
ups. The paper considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of policy 
reform with regard to capital gains taxation, innovation subsidies, public R&D spending and 
other policy initiatives. 
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Young technology ﬁrms are an important source of innovation and growth. For this reason,
policy makers have increasingly focussed attention to the conditions for business creation
in the technology sectors. It seems that a large number of high quality entrepreneurs with
promising ideas emerges more easily in an active research environment. However, potential
entrepreneurs must confront some formidable barriers if they intend to commercialize their
ideas by starting a ﬁrm. Among the most often cited barriers to start new ﬁrms are lack
of capital and commercial inexperience. Innovative young ﬁrms have high potential but
are very risky as well. Developing a business idea into a new marketable product involves
formidable technological and managerial risks. Given that these ﬁrms cannot show yet a
past track record and have not yet accumulated suﬃcient collateral, it is diﬃcult to raise
external risk capital. A further diﬃculty for external ﬁnanciers is that the main ideas are
embodied in the entrepreneur’s person. Start-up entrepreneurs have not yet proven their
ability to manage a ﬁrm. They need not only money to ﬁnance start-up investment and
research expenditure but also business contacts, strategic advice and other managerial
support in building the ﬁrm. Experienced venture capitalists (VCs) can oﬀer “informed
capital” by giving both money and managerial advice.
A considerable theoretical and empirical literature in ﬁnancial economics has ex-
plored how VCs screen, select, ﬁnance, monitor and advise their portfolio companies
[see Aghion and Tirole (1994), Bascha and Walz (2001), Bergemann and Hege (1998),
Casamatta (2003), Cumming and MacIntosh (2002), Hellmann (1998), Hellmann and
Puri (2000,2002), Inderst and Müller (2003), Kaplan and Strömberg (2000,2001), Repullo
and Suarez (1999), Schmidt (2003), and the research summarized in Gompers and Lerner
(1999)]. This literature is largely partial equilibrium and studies in detail the dynamics of
the relationship and optimal contractual arrangements between VCs and entrepreneurs.
Gromb and Scharfstein (2002) and Michelacci and Suarez (2002) investigate models of
equilibrium entrepreneurship. This paper is on the real side of VC ﬁnance and consid-
ers the development of new ﬁrms beginning with an early seed phase, followed by a VC
1ﬁnanced start-up period and ending with the introduction of a new good when the ﬁrm
matures to production stage. An analysis of start-up entrepreneurship and innovation
in industry equilibrium is important since the main policy interest in a viable VC sec-
t o rf o c u s e so ni t sr o l ea sa ne n g i n eo fi n n o v a t i o nd r i v e ng r o w t ha n dj o bc r e a t i o ni nn e w
industries [European Commission (1994,1998), Botazzi and DaRin (2002)].
Empirical evidence shows that VC can signiﬁcantly promote innovation and business
growth. Based on a sample of ﬁrms located in Silicon valley, Hellmann and Puri (2000,
2002) show that VC importantly enhances the professionalization and commercial orienta-
tion of young ﬁrms.1 VC backed ﬁrms introduce more radical innovations and pursue more
aggressive market strategies compared to other start-ups. For example, once a VC joins
the ﬁrm and provides ﬁnance, the probability of introducing a new product jumps up by a
factor of more than three! Rapid market introduction is strategically important since the
ﬁrst ﬁrm enjoys a ﬁrst mover advantage. On a more aggregate level, Kortum and Lerner
(2000) show that a Dollar of R&D spending in VC backed ﬁrms creates more patents and
more radical innovations than the same expenditure in other ﬁrms. They calculate that
VC ﬁnanced R&D accounts for roughly 14 percent of U.S. industrial innovation in 1998
although it amounts to only about 3 percent of all R&D funds.
The real eﬀects of venture capital, i.e. the ability to locate and select promising
projects and to add value in terms of strategic business advice, depend not only on the
VCs’ own managerial qualiﬁcations and investment knowhow but also on their incentives
to be actively engaged in portfolio companies. The supply of experienced ﬁnanciers with
useful business contacts and knowledge of the industry is a scarce resource that is not easily
accumulated in short order and may become a considerable bottleneck in the development
of a healthy VC sector. An equilibrium analysis of the VC industry should pay due
attention to the slow entry of experienced ﬁnanciers. The other precondition for the
development of an active VC sector and a high rate of business creation is the supply
1Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) model the coexistence of bank and VC ﬁnanced ﬁrms in a common
m a r k e tw h e r et h es t r a t e g i ca d v i c eo fV C sh e l p sﬁrms to earn a quality premium over other ﬁrms in the
market. See Black and Gilson (1998) for an informal discussion of bank versus VC ﬁnance.
2of entrepreneurs with innovative ideas. The case study by Becker and Hellmann (2002)
identiﬁed the lack of skilled entrepreneurs as a prime reason for the slow development of
VC in Germany. Representatives of the industry often complain about the lack of high
quality entrepreneurs as well. An active research environment is certainly conducive to
the creation of innovative ﬁrms. The VC industry tends to be geographically concentrated
in the neighborhood of universities and other centers of basic research. The human capital
created in these institutions expands the supply of inventive people who might consider
to turn their research ideas into a business start-up. The government might be able to
concentrate research spending in areas with a potential for commercial applications and a
correspondingly high probability of spin-oﬀs. It can also spend on other complementary
measures such as entrepreneurial training to encourage more spin-oﬀs.
To turn a promising idea into a new ﬁrm, researchers must also face the right incen-
tives to give up safe employment for a risky entrepreneurial career. Given their lack of
commercial experience, entrepreneurs need strategic business advice in addition to capi-
tal. The success of new ventures hinges not only on the entrepreneur’s research expertise
but also on the willingness of VCs to become closely involved in the ﬁrm. Given the
unique skills and specialization of each side of the relationship, a suitable matching of
entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers tends to be subject to frictions. Therefore, the frequency
of VC ﬁnanced business creation will depend on equilibrium market tightness, i.e. the
relative supply of inventive entrepreneurs in need of VC and of experienced VCs in search
of investment opportunities. Once an investment is undertaken, a ﬁnancial contract must
be designed to allocate the right incentives for value creating eﬀort. Since both the en-
trepreneur and the VC must simultaneously contribute to the venture, they need both
to participate in the upside potential of the ﬁr m . I nf o c u s i n go nt h ee ﬀects of VC on
the quality and quantity of innovative business creation, this paper necessarily adopts a
somewhat simpler model of ﬁnancial contracting that captures nevertheless the essence of
the problem. In our simple framework of double moral hazard, a straight equity contract
suﬃces to implement an optimal contractual arrangement.2
2The ﬁnance literature has emphasized the importance of staging, syndication, allocation of control
3The paper investigates the welfare properties of industry equilibrium and analyzes
a range of public policies that are meant to promote innovation by facilitating start-up
entrepreneurship in new industries [see Boadway and Tremblay (2002) for an informal
policy discussion of welfare issues with respect to innovation]. A speciﬁc policy analysis
of VC ﬁnance from a public ﬁnance perspective is largely missing. The ﬁnancial economics
literature has abstained from an explicit formal analysis of public policy [see Lerner (2002)
for a verbal discussion of important policy issues], and the public ﬁnance literature has not
considered speciﬁc models of VC backed entrepreneurship. Gompers and Lerner (1998)
and Poterba (1989a,b) have empirically investigated the eﬀects of the capital gains tax
on VC ﬁnanced entrepreneurship and have found that the impact of the tax is mainly on
the entrepreneurs’ career choice. Gordon (1998), Cullen and Gordon (2002), and Rosen
(2002) demonstrate that taxes can impair entrepreneurship. None of these contributions
in public ﬁnance consider the speciﬁc aspects of VC ﬁnance.
This paper is close to Keuschnigg (2002) and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003a,b) who
analyze the eﬀects of taxes on VC backed entrepreneurship. These authors, however,
allocate all bargaining power to VCs, do not consider the matching of VC in a search
m a r k e ta n da l s od on o tm o d e lt h ee ﬀe c to fV Cb a c k e de n t r e p r e n e u r s h i po ni n n o v a t i o n .I n
particular, this paper extends the analysis by explicitely considering the entry decision of
VCs and their choice of the number of portfolio companies to ﬁnance and advise. This
paper distinguishes a short- and long-run equilibrium and explains not only the number
of ﬁrms but also the number of VC funds in the long-run industry equilibrium. The paper
is importantly related to Inderst and Müller (2003) and, in particular, shares their short-
and long-run analysis of VC entry in a search market but importantly extends their work
rights and use of convertible securities to overcome incentive problems [see Bergloef (1994), Casamatta
(2003), Gompers (1995), Hellmann (1998), Neher (1999), Hart (2001), Tirole (2001) and Schmidt (2003),
for example]. Taking account of these aspects of VC contracts requires a dynamic and more diﬃcult
modeling. Kaplan and Strömberg (2001, p.427) emphasize, however, that cash ﬂow and control rights
are more like complements rather than substitutes. Our simpler static model with straight equity ﬁnance
should thus roughly capture the incentive problems between entrepreneurs and VCs.
4by endogenizing venture returns in an explicitly modeled output market for innovative
goods and by an extended analysis of public policy.
The paper now proceeds with section 2 where a model of VC backed innovation is
introduced. Starting from an untaxed market equilibrium, section 3 considers the com-
parative static and welfare eﬀects of various piecemeal policy reforms, both in the short-
and the long-run. These policy initiatives include public spending on basic research,
grants for experimental research in the seed phase, entry subsidies to VCs, a tax or alter-
natively an investment tax credit on start-up investment spending, capital gains taxation
and, ﬁnally, output subsidies to mature ﬁrms that have successfully entered the product
market. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
To take account of the small size of the venture capital (VC) industry, we distinguish a
large traditional and a small innovative sector where start-up ﬁrms introduce new goods.
Production and ﬁnance in the traditional sector poses no special problems. In the entre-
preneurial sector, however, the market orientation and growth of new ﬁrms can beneﬁt
substantially from the close cooperation and joint eﬀort of technology entrepreneurs and
commercially experienced venture capitalists (VCs).
VC backed business creation involves the following sequence of events (“time line”).
First, the government speciﬁes the policy environment. Second, potential entrepreneurs
undertake a seed investment and search for VC ﬁnancing. VCs, in turn, search for prof-
itable investment opportunities. Third, after having found a suitable partner in a match-
ing market, VCs and entrepreneurs bargain over an incentive compatible contract. Fourth,
given the terms of the contract, a ﬁxed start-up investment is undertaken and entrepre-
neurs and VCs expend joint eﬀort to make the ﬁrm a success (double moral hazard).
Fifth, risk is resolved, i.e. the ﬁrm matures to production stage or fails. Finally, proﬁts
are shared according to the contract terms. Agents spend on consumption of innovative
5and traditional goods. Given the sequential nature of decisions, the model is solved by
backward induction. We thus start with production of established ﬁrms and consumer
spending, given the income derived in previous stages of the VC cycle.
2.1 Demand
Depending on the previous career, agents are endowed with disposable net income yi
which they spend on traditional and innovative goods,
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Earning income may require a welfare reducing eﬀort li by agent i ∈ [0,1].T h e h o m o -
geneous traditional good Zi is the numeraire.T h e q u a n t i t y Di yields convave utility,
u0 > 0 >u 00,w h e r eDi is a subutility over consumption xi
j of diﬀerentiated goods as in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The upper index denotes the identity of the agent and the lower
index indicates the speciﬁc brand or variety, j ∈ [1,N], which is available at a price qj.
T h eb a s k e to fi n n o v a t i v eg o o d si sp u r c h a s e da tap r i c ei n d e xV given by
V · D























Diﬀerent varieties are imperfectly substitutable where σ = ρ/(ρ − 1) > 1 is the con-
stant elasticity of substitution. When σ →∞ , the innovative good is homogeneous with
perfectly substitutable varieties. Given a quantity Di, standard optimization yields a













Assuming an isoelastic speciﬁcation u(D)=φ
1/λD1−1/λ/(1 − 1/λ), demand for the ﬁnal





= V, D = φV
−λ,λ < σ . (4)
3It will be seen that ﬁrm entry expands supply but also stimulates demand. The restriction λ<σ
ensures that ﬁrm entry reduces excess demand in the product market.
6The assumed structure of preferences in (1) implies several properties of demand.
The separability and linearity eliminates income eﬀects in eﬀort choice and demand for
innovative goods. All agents demand the same quantity D. Assuming a mass one of
households, this is also aggregate demand. Derived demand xj is identical across agents
as well. With a large number N of varieties, individuals take the price index and aggregate
quantity, V and D, as given and independent of any speciﬁc variety price qj. Therefore,
the perceived price elasticity of demand for good j is (dxj/xj)/(dqj/qj)=−σ, see (3).
Since demand for innovative goods as in (2-4) is indepent of income, all changes in
income are absorbed by demand for traditional goods, Zi = yi − VD. Substituting this
into the utility function yields indirect utility equal to the sum of eﬀort adjusted income




i + C (V ),C (V )=u(D) − VD, C
0 (V )=−D. (5)
The derivative of consumer surplus C0 uses the optimality condition (4).
2.2 Production and Eﬀort
Production in the traditional sector is standard and poses no special incentive problems.
One unit of labor yields one unit of output. Perfect competition implies a wage equal
to the output price which is normalized to unity, w =1 .W i t h L workers employed in
manufacturing, supply of the traditional good is L.
In the innovative sector, each entrepreneurial ﬁrm is specialized in the production of
one brand and supplies the entire market segment. Once a start-up ﬁrm has successfully
matured to production stage, it produces xj units of brand j,u s i n gxj units of the
traditional good as an input. The technology is linear with an input output coeﬃcient
of one. Government possibly oﬀers an output subsidy zX.S i n c e ﬁrms are monopolists
in their market segment and brands are imperfectly substitutable, they can exploit local
market power to set a proﬁt maximizing price,





qjxj − xj s.t. (dxj/xj)/(dqj/qj)=−σ
ª
. (6)
7Maximizing proﬁts leads ﬁrms to set the price equal to a mark up ρ over unit costs (equal









Sales are read from the demand curve in (3).
The proﬁts of a venture as in (7) will materialize only if the ﬁrm successfully matures
to production stage. In the start-up phase, the business idea must be developed to a
marketable good which is a risky activity subject to a high failure rate. Only a fraction
p of all start-ups eventually succeed while the rest fails before any proﬁti se a r n e d . I n
this case, output is zero by assumption and proﬁts never materialize. It is assumed that
the ﬁrm’s success probability depends on the entrepreneur’s more technologically oriented
eﬀort e and the VC’s managerial involvement and advice a.E ﬀorts are assumed intangible,
non-verifyable and non-contractible. Both types of inputs are continuous. To keep the
analysis tractable, the success probability is specialized to
p = p(e,a)=p0e
 a
α,α +  <1. (8)
The parameter restriction implies decreasing returns to eﬀort, i.e. the success rate is
concave in a proportional increase in joint eﬀort.
Apart from intangible eﬀort, the ﬁrm must also invest a ﬁxed quantity I of tradi-




investment is possibly subsidized (tI < 0)o rt a x e d( tI > 0) by the state.
2.3 Making a Deal
Entrepreneurs are assumed to have no own wealth and must rely on an outside investor to
fund the project. Being inexperienced in commercial matters, they seek not only capital
but also strategic business advice. After having located a suitable partner, the VC and
the entrepreneur must strike a deal. When bargaining over a contract they anticipate
how the ﬁnancial incentives will later on determine the level of eﬀort. Since both partners
8make a valuable contribution, they must both share in the upside potential of the ﬁrm to
strengthen their incentives for eﬀort at the margin. Incentive compatible proﬁt sharing
can be supported by a simple equity contract. The deal is that the VC pays a price Q for
as t a k e1 − s in the ﬁrm, leaving a share s to the entrepreneur. Since the entrepreneur
has no own wealth, the VC’s price Q = B +
¡
1+tI¢
I must pay for the entire start-up
cost plus some upfront payment B. With this arrangement, and given tax rates tE and
tF of the entrepreneur and VC (index F for ﬁnancier), expected income or capital gains


















If the ﬁrm were sold after the start-up phase, an investor would pay a price π equal to
the level of proﬁts at production stage. The value of the venture is π. The VC’s expected
capital gain on this deal is (1 − s)pπ−Q and is subject to a capital gains tax at rate tF if
there is any. The entrepreneur makes an initial capital gain B upon concluding the deal,
and spπ when the ﬁrm is sold at the beginning of the production stage.4
The expected income or capital gain must be high enough to compensate for the
entrepreneur’s eﬀort and opportunity cost which is the outside wage in manufacturing.
Both agents incur intangible eﬀort costs which are assumed linear with β and γ being
the relevant marginal costs. The entrepreneur can leave the ﬁrm and earn a wage in the
traditional sector if no agreement is found. By the participation condition, her expected
income net of eﬀort cost must be at least as high as her outside wage, i.e. she must receive
a non-negative surplus SE ≥ 0,
SE = Y E − βe− w, SF = Y F − γa,
S = Y E + Y F − γa− βe− w.
(10)
The VC must not only break even on its investment to pay back the funds raised but
must also receive compensation for the managerial eﬀort spent on advising the portfolio
4The distinction between capital gains and ordinary income is somewhat blurred in our framework.
Instead of a capital gains tax, one might alternatively interpret tE as the entrepreneur’s personal income
tax rate which applies to her dividends sπ received during production stage and her upfront payment B
which could also be a non-performance related base salary.
9companies. Her surplus on a single portfolio company ist SF. The VC’s entry decision
occurs at the beginning of the VC cycle. Her opportunity cost in terms of an outside
w a g ei sd i s t r i b u t e do nap o r t f o l i oo fﬁrms, see section 2.5 below. Adding up yields a joint
surplus S = SE + SF per ﬁrm.
When bargaining over a deal, the VC and entrepreneur must anticipate how the terms
of the contract determine incentives for eﬀort at later stages. This gives rise to the two
incentive compatibility constraints ICE and ICF which are stated as ﬁrst order conditions













(1 − s)pa (e,a)π = γ.
(11)
Optimal eﬀorts are chosen simultaneously, taking the involvement of the other part-
ner as given. Since the upfront payment B and the outside wage w are already sunk at
eﬀort stage, and since the need for ﬁxed capital spending I is unrelated to eﬀort levels,
they cannot have an impact on eﬀort choice. Eﬀorts exclusively depend on the incentives
created by the agreed proﬁt sharing and are simultaneously determined by the two in-
centive constraints, giving e(s,·) and a(s,·). Substituting into the deﬁnitions of surplus
reduces the problem to ﬁnding proﬁt maximizing values of the equity stake s and upfront
payment B. These two components of the ﬁnancial contract diﬀer in an important way
that allows for a recursive solution. The proﬁts h a r ei n ﬂuences incentives in subsequent
eﬀort stage and, thus, the size of the pie to be distributed, while the upfront payment
B does not since it is not related to performance. In bargaining over the joint surplus,
the entrepreneur and VC will therefore ﬁrst agree on a Pareto eﬃcient share s to advance
their joint interest and then adjust B to ﬁnd an appropriate distribution of the surplus.
This results in a contract on the “Pareto frontier” as in Inderst and Mueller (2003).
Proposition 1 (ProﬁtS h a r i n ga n dJ o i n tE ﬀort) (a) Entrepreneurial eﬀort e and
managerial support a increase with venture returns π and decline with taxes tE and tF.A
10higher share s boosts the entrepreneur’s eﬀort but undermines VC advice.
(b) The Pareto-optimal share s increases with a higher tax tF on expected VC income and
falls with a higher tax on entrepreneurial income tE. The proﬁt share is independent of
venture returns as well as taxes when rates are identical, tE = tF.
Proof. See appendix A and, in particular, equations (A.2) and (A.6) for part (a) and
(A.6-8) for part (b).
Taxes discourage eﬀort because they cut the returns to eﬀort. More interestingly,
eﬀort depends not only on one’s own tax rate but also on the tax rate applied to the other
partner. When the VC gets taxed more heavily, she advises less intensively. Since eﬀorts
are complements, less VC support also reduces the returns to entrepreneurial eﬀort. For
this reason, a tax on VCs reduces the entrepreneur’s eﬀo r t .T h es a m ec r o s se ﬀect applies
to the taxation of entrepreneurs, see (A.2). Furthermore, allocating a larger stake to the
entrepreneur at the expense of the VC’s share strengthens the returns to entrepreneurial
eﬀort while weakening the VC’s incentives, with obvious consequences for eﬀort choice.
Part (b) is also intuitive. Raising the entrepreneur’s tax discourages her eﬀort and
makes her contribution to the joint surplus more expensive. Hence, the team relies more
on VC eﬀort by raising the VC’s share and leaving a correspondingly smaller share to
the entrepreneur. When the VC is taxed more, the team ﬁnds it optimal to raise the
entrepreneur’s share. If the same tax rate applies to both, the Pareto-optimal share is
a constant as in (A.8), and exclusively depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of the VC’s
and entrepreneur’s eﬀort in raising the survival rate. In the symmetric case of α =  ,t h e
share is exactly half, s =1 /2.N o t e ﬁnally, that in all cases the agreed equity stake is
independent of the upfront payment.
Proposition 2 (Sharing Joint Surplus) Bargaining over the upfront payment B,t h e
entrepreneur gets a share ˜ ξ a n dt h eV Cas h a r e1 − ˜ ξ of the joint surplus,
S
E = ˜ ξ · S, S
F =
³
1 − ˜ ξ
´




(1 − tE)ξ +( 1− tF)(1− ξ)
. (12)
11Proof. Since B has no inﬂuence on s, a and e, maximizing (11) with respect to B






(1 − ξ)SE. Expanding appropriately
and noting S = SE + SF gives (12).
The upfront payment B is chosen to allocate to each partner a share of the joint private
surplus as in (12). VCs and entrepreneurs divide according to their modiﬁed bargaining
power ˜ ξ. The entrepreneur’s share becomes independent of tax rates, ξ = ˜ ξ,o n l yi fb o t h
agents are subject to the same capital gains tax rate.
2.4 Matching of Venture Capital
Research and managerial skills are fundamentally diﬀerent. It is thus assumed that an
exogenously given part M of the population of mass one is endowed with managerial
skills and the rest 1−M with variable research abilities that might lead with some eﬀort
to new product designs. The M born managers either choose a management career in
manufacturing or set up a VC fund to coach new ﬁrms. With F denoting the number
of ﬁnanciers, or VCs, the managerial skills are endogenously split according to M =
F +( M − F). In fact, we will take this decomposition as ﬁxed in the short-run while it
is endogenously determined in a long-run equilibrium with free entry. This reﬂects the
observation by Gompers and Lerner (1999, p.4): “Not only is it diﬃcult to raise a new
venture capital fund without a track record, but the skills needed for successful venture
capital investing are diﬃcult and time-consuming to acquire”.
T h er e s to ft h ep o p u l a t i o n1 − M is endowed with research skills enabling them to
become workers or researchers, giving a split 1 − M = R +( 1− M − R) as in Figure 1
below. Among all researchers with a business idea only a part E succeeds to obtain ﬁnance
and advice and are able to start a ﬁr m .T h i sm a s so fs t a r t - u pe n t repreneurs results from
a matching allocation between researchers seeking ﬁnance and VCs seeking investments.
After having sunk an eﬀo r tc o s ti nt h ei n i t i a la t t e m p ta te n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p ,t h er e s tR−E
turns to employment in the traditional sector, giving a decomposition R = E +(R − E).
Total employment L in the traditional sector thus consists of 1−M−R ‘born workers’ who
12avoided entrepreneurship right from the beginning, plus R − E unmatched researchers,
plus M − F born managers who chose not to enter the VC business:
L =( 1− M − R)+( R − E)+( M − F)=1− E − F. (13)
In other words, who is not a start-up entrepreneur or a VC ends up being a worker in
the traditional sector. For simplicity, all types of agents earn the same wage in the old
economy, irrespective of whether they are endowed with managerial or technological skills.
In the VC market, F VCs search for proﬁtable investment opportunities and R re-
searchers, or potential technology entrepreneurs, consider to start a ﬁrm and seek informed
capital. VCs are specialized in rather diﬀerent industries and have accumulated speciﬁc
contacts with clients, suppliers, and specialized personnel that are valuable only in the
same industry. The same holds for the speciﬁc knowledge of the market opportunities
of certain technologies. The VCs’ commercial and managerial knowhow is therefore not
equally useful for all entrepreneurial ventures. A productive matching of VCs and entre-
preneurs is subject to frictions. It takes time to locate a suitable partner especially since
a pair of VC and entrepreneur enter a close relationship in the start-up ﬁrm. In a static
model, this time consuming search activity is reﬂe c t e di nt h ef a c tt h a to n l yp a r to ft h e
potential entrepreneurs participating in the search market locate a ﬁnancier, and only
part of the ﬁnancing oﬀers are successfully invested.5
Formally, we assume that each of the R researchers who consider entrepreneurship
prepares a business plan and searches for informed capital.6 On the other side of the
VC market, each VC chases for proﬁtable deals by making vF ﬁnancing oﬀers in total.
Only a smaller number E of them is successfully matched and results in a deal. A linear
homogeneous technology E = E (vF,R) determines the matching rates7
E/vF = f (θ),E / R = f (θ)/θ, θ ≡ R/vF. (14)
5In reality, the funds raised are usually considerably higher than the funds invested. The excess funds
presumably wait for other promising investments.
6Before a VC joins the ﬁrm, these seed investments are often ﬁnanced by family or other sources. The
model treats this as intangible research and search eﬀort rather than real expenditure.
7Diamond (1990) has introduced a search model of the credit market. Michelacci and Suarez (2002)
13Using f (θ) ≡ E (1,θ), the matching rates satisfy f0 (θ) > 0 and d[f (θ)/θ]/dθ < 0 as well
as 0 <f(θ) < 1 and 0 <f(θ)/θ < 1.O u to fa l lvF ﬁnancing oﬀers, only a fraction f (θ)
is actually ﬁnanced. Therefore, a VC ﬁnances and advises an average number of portfolio
ﬁrms equal to E/F = f (θ)v.T h er a t i oθ of potential entrepreneurs R to the number of
ﬁnancing oﬀers vF is a measure of market tightness. In taking market tightness as given,
a VC can generate a larger number of deals and end up with a larger portfolio of ﬁrms if
she raises her search intensity v.
On the other market side, only a fraction f (θ)/θ of potential entrepreneurs locate a
VC. Matching splits potential entrepreneurs into E =[ f (θ)/θ]R = f (θ)vF active VC
ﬁnanced entrepreneurs while the others, R − E, turn to their outside opportunity and
remain workers. The higher is θ, the tighter is the VC market, and the less likely will
potential entrepreneurs locate VC ﬁnance to start a ﬁrm, d[f (θ)/θ]/dθ < 0. In contrast,
VCs will identify proﬁtable investments more easily, f0 (θ) > 0, so that a larger fraction of
their oﬀers translates into a successful deal. The change in market tightness reﬂects the
increase in R and vF on each side of the market. The sensitivity of successful matches,
i.e. the number of VC backed start-ups, with respect to aggregate search activity of VCs


















2.5 Searching for a Deal
To allow for a ﬁnitely elastic supply of potential entrepreneurs, we assume that agents
diﬀer by their inventive ability, i.e. the required research eﬀort for a new business idea.8
When an agent decides to enter the search competition for VC, she incurs a cost ki and
and Inderst and Müller (2003) similarly apply a matching function to study the allocation of informed
capital to start-up ﬁrms. They do not endogenize the VC’s search intensity.
8A key assumption is that this heterogeneity in research cost does not carry over to the quality of
the business idea. Once the ﬁrm is started, they are all homogeneous. This helps to concentrate on the
moral hazard problems during the start-up phase.
14becomes a potential technology entrepreneur. This cost is interpreted as an eﬀort cost or
time input that is necessary to produce an idea for a new product or service and prepare
a business plan. We assume, for simplicity, that the population with research skills is
distributed uniformly in ki, i.e. all types are represented with uniform density. Without






κ,k i > 0 >k G,κ ≡ iki/k
i,i ∈ [0,1 − M]. (16)
Private research eﬀort in the seed phase can be reduced by public spending on research and
development (R&D) in areas that are particularly amenable to commercial applications.
Basic research and the associated human capital formation reduces the research cost of
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Figure 1: Seed Investments
Preparing for an entrepreneurial career requires to invest in research eﬀort and prepare
a business plan that can be presented to a VC for ﬁnancing the venture. The government
may wish to oﬀer a research grant or entry subsidy zR to encourage potential entrepreneurs
in the seed phase to experiment with new ideas. An agent considers entrepreneurship and
participates in the search market for VC only if the expected return pays at least for this
(re-)search eﬀort, net of the entry subsidy. The expected return is the share of the joint
surplus of the start-up ﬁrm that she expects to bargain with the VC as in Proposition 2.
15The number of entrepreneurs in search of VC is now deﬁned by the critical agent R who
just breaks even on her research eﬀort cost net of the entry subsidy,
f (θ)
θ
· ˜ ξS = k(R,G) − z
R. (17)
Figure 1 illustrates how the indiﬀerence condition for the marginal researcher splits the
population between workers and potential entrepreneurs who do research on a business
idea and, based on this seed investment, prepare a business plan to be presented to VCs.
The ﬁgure also shows how increased public R&D funding as well as research grants for
seed investments can raise the supply of entrepreneurs.
It is assumed that VCs give up a managerial job in the old economy when choosing
to set up a VC fund. The government may wish to encourage this decision with an entry
subsidy zF. A VC fund is viable only if expected surplus (proﬁts less advisory eﬀort cost)
on the entire portfolio of ﬁrms suﬃces to compensate for the foregone wage income w of
its manager and a progressively increasing search eﬀort cost δ(v).W h e nc o n v e n i e n t ,w e
may specify δ (v)=δ0 · v1+ω/(1 + ω) with ω,δ0 > 0:
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Fª
,δ
0 (v) > 0,δ
00 (v) > 0. (18)
In chasing for investment opportunities, a VC endogenously chooses search intensity
v which corresponds to the number of ﬁnancing oﬀers posted. The VC’s search activity
results in a deal only with some probability. The matching probabilities derives from
aggregate VC search eﬀort equal to vF =
R F
0 vidi under symmetry. In making vi oﬀers,
an individual VC takes market tightness θ as given and expects to realize f (θ)vi deals
where each one yields a surplus SF as in (12). A VC’s optimal search intensity equates
marginal expected beneﬁt and cost from an extra oﬀer,
f (θ) ·
³







This condition determines individual portfolio size f (θ)v which depends on individual
search intensity, the VC’s surplus, and aggregate market tightness.
162.6 Equilibrium
Only a fraction of R potential entrepreneurs with a business plan succeed to locate a VC,
leading to E start-up ﬁrms as in (14). Depending on the eﬀort of both the entrepreneur
and VC, a new ﬁrm succeeds to develop and introduce the product on the market with
probability p(e,a). In the aggregate, a fraction p of all start-ups matures to production
stage, leaving N ﬁrms to supply diﬀerentiated goods,
N = p(e,a) · E, E = f (θ)v · F. (20)
In restricting attention to symmetric equilibria, the price and quantity indices in (2-3) are
V = N
1−ρq, D = N
ρx, V D = Nqx. (21)
Since the component price is a ﬁxed mark-up over the exogenously given unit cost as
in (7), it cannot adjust to clear the product market. Instead, market clearing depends on
sales x and thereby proﬁts π per ﬁrm. Since proﬁts are the ultimate reward of business
formation, they determine the supply of new goods as in (20). On the demand side,
when market size is ﬁnite, higher sales per brand must reduce demand for the number
of diﬀerentiated products. The price index V increases with the price of components q
but declines with product variety N.T h el a t t e re ﬀect reﬂects the gains from increasing
specialization. More variety stimulates demand. Substituting demand for the composite
good in (4) into (3) and replacing the price index by its symmetric form in (21) yields
the consumers’ trade-oﬀ between scale and variety. This trade-oﬀ yields the demand for






,λ < σ ⇒ µ =
1
ρ − (ρ − 1)λ
> 0. (22)
The demand for variety falls when each single brand is consumed in larger quantity.
Several features of the model simplify the equilibrium solution. First, mark-up pricing
in (7) ﬁxes the component price q solely in terms of the output subsidy. Second, proﬁt
is proportional to sales, π =( ρ − 1)x, so that the scale of production x also stands
17for proﬁts or venture returns. Third, proposition 1 states that the entrepreneur’s proﬁt
share is independent of venture returns and other endogenous variables, see also (A.5).
The proﬁts h a r ei sa ﬀe c t e do n l yb yd i ﬀerential tax rates but otherwise remains a ﬁxed
constant. Therefore, joint eﬀort and the success probability depend on proﬁts, and thus
x,a si n( A . 2 ) ,p(x). Fourth, the bargaining solution of Proposition 2 together with (9-10)
implicitely determines an upfront payment which, in turn, ﬁxes the joint surplus as a
function proﬁts and thereby sales x, S (x).9
With this information, we can now solve for equilibrium in the markets for VC and for
new goods. We ﬁrst turn to the short-run equilibrium with a ﬁxed number F of VCs. For
a given value of expected joint surplus S (x), equilibrium in the market for VC is brought
about by an adjustment of market tightness as illustrated in Figure 2 of section 3.1 below.
The demand for VC reﬂects the agents’ willingness to engage in seed investments. The
potential entrepreneur’s entry decision in (16), repeated as SR in (23), deﬁnes a demand
schedule for VC in terms of ﬁnancing oﬀers vD which is downward sloping in market
tightness θ. In a tighter market, researchers are less likely to obtain a VC oﬀer, i.e. the
expected return line in Figure 1 shifts down. Fewer agents thus decide to engage in seed
investments and search for VC. The upward sloping supply schedule vS for VC oﬀers
results from search investments of VCs as in (18), repeated as SF in (23). For any given
project surplus S,V C sa r em o r el i k e l yt ol o c a t eap r o ﬁtable deal when the market is
very tight. Expected returns to search are up, leading to increased search intensity and a
larger number of ﬁnancing oﬀers vS. As is illustrated in Figure 3 below, market tightness
a d j u s t su n t i lt h em a r k e tf o rV Cc l e a r s .
Higher sales x and proﬁts earned in the product market boost the joint surplus per
project and thereby strengthen the entry incentives of both researchers and VCs, shifting







,s ot h a tj o i n t
surplus in (10) depends on x exlusively. Bargaining in (12) then determines SE and thereby Y E and B,
all depending on x. The paper emphasizes very much this symmetric case. If taxes are diﬀerential, then
(9-10) yield S (x,B). The bargaining result in (12) reads SE (x,B)=˜ ξ ·S (x,B) which determines B (x)
and ultimately S (x,B (x)),o rS (x) for short.
18up both the demand and supply schedule in Figure 2. As a result, equilibrium search
activity v expands but the adjustment of market tightness is ambiguous and most likely
rather small. As a result, VC portfolio size f (θ)v increases,10 allowing for more VC
backed start-ups. Higher venture returns also strengthen incentives for joint eﬀort and
thereby make ﬁrms more likely to succeed. For both reasons, the supply of new goods,
as stated in (20), increases with venture returns x while variety demand falls by the
arguments given in (22). The condition for product market equilibrium PM is repeated





xqλ¢¤µ = p(x) · f (θ)v · F,
SR : k(R,G) − zR = S (x) · ˜ ξ · f (θ)/θ, R = θvF,
SF : δ
0 (v)=S (x) ·
³
1 − ˜ ξ
´
· f (θ),
FE : Ω = S (x) ·
³
1 − ˜ ξ
´
· f (θ)v − δ(v) − w + zF.
(23)
The supply of experienced VCs cannot expand in short order. In the short-run equi-
librium with a ﬁxed number of VC funds F, the product market condition PM and the
investment conditions SR and SF relating to VC demand and supply determine three
unknowns x, θ and v.W i t h ﬁxed F, VC funds derive rents on their scarce manager-
ial resource. Such rents should attract more VCs after a suﬃciently long period of skill
formation. Rents tend to dissipate when the industry is crowded with more VCs. In
the competitive long-run equilibrium with free entry (FE), a zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o nΩ =0
endogenizes F, the equilibrium number of VCs.11
2.7 Welfare
To arrive at a welfare based evaluation of various policy initiatives, one must ﬁrst iden-
tify potential market distortions and the associated margins for welfare improvements.
Indirect utility in (5) depends on income, adjusted for eﬀort costs, plus consumer surplus
10This statement is shown more precisely in the appendix, see the next section.
11Technically, SF and FE combine to vδ
0 (v)=δ (v)+zF − w and ﬁx the search intensity v.G i v e nv,
SR and SF solve for θ(F) and x(F) so that PM yields the equilibrium number F of VCs.
19derived from the consumption of innovative goods. Appendix B derives an aggregate
welfare measure, and appendix C.1 shows how welfare changes along with equilibrium
policy eﬀects, see (C.7). To avoid complicated tax base eﬀects, the paper considers only
small policy changes relative to an initial equilibrium without taxes and subsidies. Using
the hat notation to denote percentage changes relative to this untaxed position (such as
ˆ x ≡ dx/x), welfare changes according to12
dU∗ =( q − 1)xN · ˆ x +( q − 1)xN · ρˆ p
+( 1 − s)πN ·  ˆ e +( 1− (1 − s))πN · αˆ a
+( η − ξ)SE · ˆ θ +( KG − 1)G · ˆ G.
(24)
The ﬁrst term relates to mark-up pricing in (7). In exploiting market power, mature
ﬁrms charge a price q>1 in excess of marginal cost and thereby restrict demand. An
increase in sales and thereby consumption of diﬀerentiated goods raises welfare (scale
eﬀect). With a ﬁxed proﬁt margin, increased sales lead to higher proﬁts which, in turn,
encourages joint eﬀort and boosts the success rate. Accordingly, a larger number of start-
ups succeeds to production stage and thereby expands product variety. The second term
relates to this variety eﬀect which is also proportional to the margin q − 1.
The third and fourth terms indicate that both an increase in entrepreneurial eﬀort
and VC advice augment welfare. These two terms point to an underinvestment in eﬀort.
If both agents were able to committ to mutually agreed eﬀo r tl e v e l si nt h e i rj o i n ti n t e r e s t ,
they would maximize joint surplus in (9-10), S = p(e,a)π−βe−γa−I−w, without being
further restricted by any incentive constraints. They would decide on ﬁrst best levels of
eﬀort given by πpe (e,a)=β and πpa (e,a)=γ. Accordingly, each individual should be
full residual claimant on her investment of extra eﬀo r ts ot h a tm a r g i n a lc o s t sβ and γ are
equated with the full social returns πpa and πpe. However, since eﬀort is not verifyable and
12We slightly rewrite (C.7) by using E = Rf (θ)/θ as in (14) and S = S∗, as it holds in the untaxed
initial equilibrium, see the remark on (B.4). The result in (24) follows upon noting the change in market
tightness, ˆ θ = ˆ R − ˆ v − ˆ F.F u r t h e r ,KG ≡−
R R
0 kG (i,G)di stands for the aggregate private savings on
account of larger public R&D spending.
20not contractible, a double moral hazard problem emerges. Neither of the two agents will
be able to credibly committ to any promised eﬀort level so that eﬀo r tm u s tb ee l i c i t e db y
means of ﬁnancial incentives. Both agents must simultaneously participate in the upside
potential of the ﬁrm and must therefore share proﬁts. The incentive constraints in (11)
thus result in an underinvestment of entrepreneurial eﬀort and managerial support. While
agents must bear the full private cost of eﬀort, the entrepreneur is able to appropriate
only a share s of the marginal increase in expected proﬁts while a part 1 − s actually
beneﬁts the VC. A similar argument applies to the VC’s advisory eﬀort. For this reason,
any policy that succeeds to strengthen joint eﬀort, yields ﬁrst order welfare gains. As the
second line in (24) shows, these welfare gains are proportional to the external gains or
spillovers of individual eﬀort to the other side of the relationship.13
The ﬁrst term in the last line of (24) points out the welfare consequences of a change
in VC market tightness θ. This term would be absent if the so-called Hosios condition
ξ = η were satisﬁed (Hosios 1990). Search intensity and entry are eﬃcient if the property
rights on the returns to search are appropriately allocated (via bargaining power ξ)t oc o r -
respond to each party’s eﬀectiveness in generating a match, as measured by the matching
elasticity η. Suppose now that entrepreneurs’ bargaining power falls short of their match-
ing elasticity, ξ<η . In this case, entrepreneurs are able to negotiate only a relatively
small share of the joint surplus, leaving a too large share to VCs. Correspondingly, en-
trepreneurs are too reluctant to pursue seed investments and to enter the search market
while VCs’ incentives to search for new investment opportunities are excessive. Market
13In principle, the government can compensate for the beneﬁcial spillovers of individual eﬀort on the






(1 − s)=1 .
Substituting into (11) shows that this would induce ﬁr s tb e s te ﬀort. Before drawing any immediate policy
conclusions, however, one should emphasize that the industry has partly developed its own solutions to
alleviate the problem. Schmidt (2003) among others has shown that the use of convertible securities can
go a long way to allocate the right incentives at the right time to each partner. Stage ﬁnancing, i.e. the
tying of further ﬁnancing rounds to the achievement of predeﬁned milestones, also addresses the problem.
However, as long as both inputs must be supplied simultaneously at least in some stages of the ﬁrm’s
development, the problem never fully disappears
21tightness θ is ineﬃciently low. Correspondingly, a policy would boost welfare by raising
market tightness via stimulating seed investments or retarding VCs’ search activities.
Finally, the last term in (24) points to a productive role of the public sector. The
government could allocate a part G of public R&D spending to activities that are more
amenable for commercial applications. More spending would raise welfare as long as the
marginal reduction of the entrepreneurs’ entry costs in the aggregate exceeds the marginal
budget cost, KG =
R R
0 −kG(i,G)di > 1.
3 Piecemeal Policy Reform
Public policy towards the VC industry includes a number of actual and potential strate-
gies. To begin with, policy makers and representatives of the industry often consider the
capital gains tax as the most important tax barrier to VC investments. Second, many
countries subsidize start-up capital cost by means of interest subsidies and direct invest-
ment tax credits to young ﬁrms which corresponds to choosing tI < 0 in the present model
framework. Third, entrepreneurial experimentation can be encouraged by research grants
for seed investments, zR in our model. Other initiatives might aim to attract additional
VCs, for example by awarding an entry subsidy zF. Fourth, public innovation policy
often aims to facilitate technology transfer to the private sector by shifting a larger part
G of R&D funds to applied areas with promising commercial applications. Such spending
raises the probability of spin-oﬀs and is conducive to innovative business start-ups. Fifth,
innovation is rewarded by local market power and monopolistic proﬁts for the specialized
brands that successful start-ups introduce in the market. On the negative side, mark-up
pricing restricts demand and consumer surplus which can be addressed in terms of an
output subsidy zX. The following analysis explores the comparative static and welfare
eﬀects of such policy initiatives. The results are conveniently summarized in Tables 1 and
2. Except for subsection 4.4 below, we will assume that any net budget cost is ﬁnanced
with a lump-sum tax that involves no excess burden.
22Table 1: Comparative Statics
NxpS v θ
∗ vf (θ) Ω F
zX SR ++ ++ ++ ++ + + + + 0
L R ++++ 0— — 0 +
zF S R 0000 0 0 0+ 0
L R + — — ——— — 0 +
zR,G S R+ — — —+ + ++ ++ 0
LR ++ – – – 0 + + 0 +
t,tI S R+ – + +++ + + 0
LR ++ — ++ ++ 0 — — 0 +
Note: N number of mature ﬁrms, x sales and venture returns, p
success rate, S joint surplus, v VC search intensity, θ VC market
tightness, vf(θ) VC portfolio size, Ω VC rent, F number of VC
funds. *) Sign holds for η>ξ . zX Output subsidy, zF VC entry
subsidy, zR,Gresearch grant and public R&D spending. t,tI Self-
ﬁnanced capital gains tax cut.
Table 2: Long-run Welfare
Welfare eﬀects zX zF zR,G t,t I
Scale + — — —
Variety + — — +
Joint eﬀort + — — +
Market tightness∗ +— + —
R&D cost 0 0 + 0
Note: Lines refer to welfare eﬀects in (24).
*) Sign holds for η>ξ . zX Output subsidy,
zF VC entry subsidy, zR,G research grant
and public R&D spending. t,tI Self-ﬁnanced
capital gains tax cut.
We consider both a short-run eﬀect where the number of VCs with specialized invest-
ment knowhow is ﬁxed, and a long-run response with free entry and zero proﬁts. Below,
we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions in (23) and investigate how the initial equi-
librium is displaced after a small policy change. The hat notation considers logarithmic
23changes relative to the initial position, such as ˆ x ≡ dln(x)=dx/x.T oa v o i dd i v i s i o nb y
zero, one deﬁnes ˆ z = dz/(1 + z) for subsidies and ˆ t = dt/(1 − t) for tax rates. To further
simplify the analysis, we assume zR = zF =0in the initial state. Detailed calculations
are found in appendix C.
3.1 Output Subsidy on Innovative Goods
The invention and introduction of new goods allows new ﬁrms to enjoy local market
power on account of product diﬀerentiation. In our model of horizontal product innova-
tion, mark-up pricing over marginal cost unduly restricts demand and reduces consumer
surplus. Further, if a specialized producer introduces a new good, the gains from variety
reduce the price index, thereby stimulate demand and boost sales and proﬁts of other
producers as well. Mark-up pricing and demand externalities can be addressed by an
output subsidy. Starting from a laissez-faire equilibrium with other taxes set to zero, this
section considers the eﬀects of a small output subsidy given to VC backed ﬁrms.
The immediate eﬀect of the subsidy is to reduce the demand price q of innovative
goods while the producer price is still chosen as a ﬁxed mark-up over unit cost. Proﬁts of
a specialized ﬁrm are not immediately aﬀected but increase only if the subsidy stimulates
demand and sales in equilibrium. By (7),
ˆ q = −ˆ z
X, ˆ π =ˆ x. (25)
Short-Run Adjustment: We ﬁrst consider the case of a ﬁxed number of VCs. The
reduction in demand prices creates excess demand in the product market and, thus, stim-
ulates sales and proﬁts of mature ﬁrms. The proﬁtp e rﬁrm is a measure of venture returns
which aﬀects incentives in earlier stages of the VC cycle. Entrepreneurs supply more ef-
fort during the start-up phase when the reward is higher. VCs advise more intensively
as well, see the incentive constraints in (11). Since eﬀorts are complements, they are
mutually reinforcing, leading to an overall increase in the ﬁrms’ success probability as in
24(C.1). One stage earlier, the entrepreneur must bargain with a VC to ﬁnance the start-up
investment cost of the venture. The VC buys an equity stake for a price that pays for the
start-up cost and in addition includes a non-performance related upfront payment. The
contract results in the entrepreneur and VC sharing the joint surplus of the project as in
P r o p o s i t i o n2 .A ni n c r e a s ei nv e n t u r er e t u r n sˆ π =ˆ x obviously boosts the joint surplus,
see (C.3).14
In the seed phase, researchers anticipate their share in the joint surplus which deter-
mines their incentives to conduct experimental research leading to a business plan. The
marginal investment condition is stated in (17) and illustrated in Figure 1. The expected
return on seed investment prior to VC ﬁnance is
f(θ)
θ ·ξS and consists of the probability to
obtain VC times the entrepreneur’s share in the expected joint surplus. The expected re-
turn just matches the research cost k(R,G) of the marginal entrepreneur R.T h eh i g h e ri s
market tightness θ, the lower is the probability of obtaining ﬁnance which shifts down the
horizontal line in Figure 1. Consequently, fewer researchers will attempt entrepreneurship
so that fewer ﬁnancing oﬀers vD are needed to satisfy their demand for VC ﬁnance. The
investment condition thus deﬁnes a demand curve for VC in terms of market tightness θ
which is downward sloping as in Figure 2.15
The supply curve follows from the search investment of VCs who expend eﬀort to
locate proﬁtable investments. The expected return on search is the probability f (θ) of
locating a suitable project times the VC’s share in joint surplus, and must match with
marginal cost of search eﬀort. The marginal cost increases with search intensity or the
number of ﬁnancing oﬀers, and the matching probability increases with market tightness.
For any given S, the investment condition (19) thus deﬁnes an upward sloping supply
14Since this scenario considers only an isolated increase of the output subsidy, all other policy instru-
ments are set to zero, i.e. ˆ t = ˆ tI =0 .
15Formally, replacing R by θvF, and taking the expexted surplus S as given, condition (17) can be
solved for demand vD in terms of θ. Solving equation SR in (C.4) for ˆ v gives the log-linearized demand
curve while SF is the supply curve for VC. Note that demand and supply is deﬁned per VC whereas the
aggregate quantity is vF.
25curve vS for VC as illustrated in Figure 2. In reducing demand prices, the output subsidy
creates excess demand for innovative goods and thereby boosts the joint surplus S of
as t a r t - u pﬁrm that is shared among entrepreneur and VC. The subsidy thus shifts up
both the supply and demand curves for VC and thus expands VC ﬁnance as captured by
search intensity v. If entry of entrepreneurs is more elastic relative to the search activity
of VCs, ω>κ , market tightness will increase as well, see (C.8) for the formal analysis.
This condition is a reference case which would always hold if the supply of entrepreneurs











Figure 2: Supply and Demand for VC
Consider now product market equilibrium in terms of supply and demand for new
goods. To obtain the supply curve in terms of venture returns x,n o t et h a tˆ S and ˆ x
are positively linked in (C.3). In raising joint surplus, higher venture returns contribute
to increased market tightness and boost search intensity in Figure 2. Each VC thus
posts not only a larger number of ﬁnancing oﬀers but also succeeds to strike a deal on
a larger share of these oﬀers when market tightness is higher. Further, since higher
venture returns strengthen joint eﬀort, a larger fraction of these deals eventually result in
market introduction of new goods. Putting these eﬀects together shows how an increase in
venture returns raises the number of mature ﬁrms N so that a larger range of diﬀerentiated
26products are on oﬀer. This upward sloping supply curve is illustrated in Figure 3 and is
formally derived in condition PM in (C.4) or (C.9) in its ﬁnal form.
For any given component price q, the demand side (3-4) deﬁnes a trade-oﬀ between
scale and variety in consumption. In other words, more quantity x per brand reduces
the demand for variety N.T h i st r a d e - o ﬀ deﬁnes a downward sloping demand curve for
new goods in terms of sales x where the component price q is a shift parameter. Figure 3
illustrates what is shown formally in PM of (C.4), i.e. ˆ N = −µˆ x+µλˆ zX. The intersection
of supply and demand curves yields the market clearing level of venture returns x.R a i s i n g
the output subsidy cuts the consumer price of all brands and stimulates demand. Holding
sales x and thereby the scale of consumption constant, the demand curve for new goods
shifts to the right in Figure 3. The subsidy leads to a new product market equilibrium
with increased sales per product and a larger number of specialized ﬁrms. Formally,
(C.10-11) state the relative changes compared to the initial equilibrium, ˆ x = ζxˆ zX > 0
and ˆ N =( ∆X − µ)
µλ


















Figure 3: Product Market Equilibrium
Knowing the equilibrium adjustment of venture returns, one can calculate all other
27repercussions of the output subsidy. Of particular interest are the welfare consequences
which are formally stated in (24). Keeping other policy instruments at zero, the output
subsidy yields welfare gains on several margins. The ﬁr s tt w ot e r m si n( 2 4 )r e l a t et ot h e
output market distortion with respect to scale and variety resulting from monopolistic
competition.16 The subsidy squeezes demand prices and thereby oﬀsets markup pricing
of innovative ﬁrms. Since demand is repressed on account of prices in excess of mar-
ginal costs, this demand stimulation yields welfare gains proportional to the price wedge,
(q − 1)xNˆ x. Second, the increase in sales of individual ﬁr m sb o o s t sp r o ﬁts, ˆ π =ˆ x.I m -
proved venture returns sharpen incentives for joint eﬀorts, raises the success probability
of start-ups and thereby the number of mature ﬁrms. The introduction of a larger range
of innovative goods raises consumer surplus due to gains from variety, (q − 1)xN · ρˆ p.
The second line in (24) reﬂects the beneﬁcial eﬀects of the output subsidy on joint eﬀort.
In the untaxed equilibrium, the wedge between the social and private returns to eﬀort is
1 − s for the entrepreneur and 1 − (1 − s) for the VC, leading to ineﬃciently low eﬀort
levels. In raising venture returns, the output subsidy boosts both entrepreneurial eﬀort
and managerial support, thereby raises expected joint surplus, and leads to a ﬁrst order
w e l f a r eg a i na si n d i c a t e di nt h es e c o n dl i n eo f( 2 4 ) .
Finally, the subsidy boosts the expected surplus of new start-up ﬁrms that is shared
among entrepreneurs and VCs as a result of bargaining. It thereby raises the prospects
of initial research eﬀorts of potential entrepreneurs and increases the number of business
plans proposed while VCs search more intensively for investment opportunities. If entry
of potential entrepreneurs is more elastic than the supply of informed capital, ω>κ ,
the policy raises VC market tightness in Figure 2. The eﬀectiveness of entrepreneurial
seed investments in generating matches and raising the number of VC backed start-ups
is measured by the elasticity η. If the entrepreneurs’ bargaining power determining their
share in the joint surplus falls short of their matching eﬀectiveness, then entrepreneurial
entry is too hesitant relative to the willingness of VCs to ﬁnance new ventures. Conse-
16Note that the same wedge q−1 measures two distortions with respect to scale and variety. In standard
models of monopolistic competition, the scale eﬀect is often absent, leaving only the variety eﬀect.
28quently, an increase in market tightness boosts welfare in case of η>ξ . If the property
rights on initial seed investments and VC search eﬀort are eﬃciently distributed and ex-
actly correspond to the eﬀectiveness of entrepreneurs and VCs in launching start-up ﬁrms
(η = ξ), the search market for VC is eﬃcient so that a small change in market tightness
is devoid of welfare consequences. Obviously, η<ξimplies that a tighter market for VC
is detrimental to welfare. If entrepreneurial entry is more elastic than VC search activity,
ω<κ , the subsidy reduces market tightness which turns around the welfare results. The
preceeding discussion is summarized in
Proposition 3 (Output Subsidy in the Short-Run) (a) Starting from an untaxed
position, the output subsidy increases venture returns x which boosts entrepreneurial eﬀort
e and managerial VC support a and results in a higher success rate p of start-up ﬁrms.
(b) It boosts joint surplus S and raises market tightness θ (if ω>κ ), VC search intensity
v and rents Ω, VC portfolio size vf (θ), and the number N of mature ﬁrms.
(c) Starting from laissez-faire, it yields welfare gains by raising consumer surplus due to
(i) higher demand for each variety and (ii) more product variety, (iii) by encouraging joint
eﬀort and (iv), if η>ξ , by encouraging entrepreneurial entry relatively more than VC
search activity (higher market tightness). If η 0 ξ, the welfare gain from higher market
tightness is zero or negative. The welfare results in (c.iv) are reversed if entrepreneurial
entry is relatively less elastic, ω<κ , and market tightness declines.
Proof. (a) See (C.10) for x and (C.1) for e, a,a n dp.( b ) ( C . 1 3 ) r e p o r t sˆ S>0,
implying ˆ θ, ˆ v and ˆ v + ηˆ θ for portfolio size in (C.8). Rents increase in line with search
intensity as in (C.16), and (C.10) gives ˆ N. (c) See the discussion of (24).
Free Entry of VCs: The number of VCs is ﬁxed in the short-run since it takes time to
acquire the necessary market knowledge, ﬁnancial expertise and reputation of a successful
VC. However, when an output subsidy or any other structural change boosts proﬁts, these
rents should eventually attract more VCs to the industry. When more projects get funded
29by a larger number of VCs, the supply curve for new products shifts to the right in Figure
3 which reduces equilibrium venture returns by ˆ x = −ζF ˆ F as noted in (C.10). When the
joint surplus of VC backed ﬁrms erodes and more VCs must share the market, ˆ S<0 < ˆ F,
each one will search less intensively and ﬁnance a smaller portfolio as in (C.8), and end up
with smaller rent as in (C.16). The process continues until rents are exhausted and entry
comes to a halt. Following an increase in the short-run, VC search intensity is reduced
as a consequence of continued entry until it is back to the original value in the long-run,
ˆ v =0in (C.16). To accommodate the extra demand created by the output subsidy, the
number of VCs increases to an extent given in (C.19), ˆ F =( µλ/∇F)ˆ zX > 0.
Since entry ˆ F>0 erodes venture returns, it works to dampen the short-run increase
in (C.10), ˆ x = ζxˆ zX − ζF ˆ F, and by implication joint eﬀorts, the success rate and project
surplus. The number of mature ﬁrms, in contrast, increases beyond the short-run eﬀect
simply because there are more VCs to ﬁnance projects. The ﬁnal, long-run eﬀects of
t h eo u t p u ts u b s i d ya r ec o m p u t e di n( C . 2 0 ) .I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,t h el o n g - r u nc h a n g ei nm a r k e t
tightness is in the opposite direction of the short-run eﬀect. This reversal is intuitive,
however. Since entrepreneurial talent is distributed unevenly, the supply of entrepreneurs
remains ﬁnitely elastic even in the long-run while free entry makes the supply of VCs
perfectly elastic. Obviously, market tightness should fall in the long-run as is veriﬁed by
(C.20). The same basic formula (24) applies to judge the long-run welfare consequences.
Proposition 4 (Output Subsidy in the Long-Run) (a) Free entry of VCs, ˆ F>0,
dampens the short-run increase in sales x, surplus S,e ﬀorts e and a,a n ds u c c e s sr a t ep.
(b) The long-run eﬀect on VC search is zero while the subsidy reduces market tightness θ
and portfolio size vf (θ). The number N of mature ﬁrms expands beyond the short-run.
(c) A small output subsidy raises consumer surplus by raising (i) scale, (ii) variety, and
(iii) joint eﬀorts. The gains are positive but smaller than in the short-run. Since market
tightness declines in the long-run, the short-run welfare eﬀects from entry and search (iv)
are reversed and negative if η>ξ , but positive (zero) if η<(=)ξ.
Proof. (a) ˆ e, ˆ a and ˆ p are proportional to ˆ x but the short-run increase in venture
30returns is dampened by ˆ F>0, see ˆ x = ζxˆ zX − ζF ˆ F in (C.10). (b) Read (C.20). Given
constant v, portfolio size vf (θ) declines in line with θ.T h e e ﬀect on ˆ N follows from
(C.10) combined with the result that the increase in ˆ x is larger in the short-run than
in the long-run. (c) Since ˆ π =ˆ x>0, welfare increases by the ﬁrst four terms in (24),
verifying (i-iii). Part (iv) relates to the last term which changes sign along with θ.
3.2 Entry Subsidy to Venture Capitalists
How does the structure of the VC sector change if policy succeeds to attract more man-
agers to ﬁnance and advise entrepreneurial ﬁrms? One possibility is to encourage the
creation of new VC funds by means of an entry subsidy zF. The analysis starts from a
laissez-faire position with zero VC proﬁts and supposes lump-sum ﬁnance of the subsidy.
Since the entry subsidy is sunk once a fund is established, it cannot aﬀect later stages
of the VC cycle. Consequently, there are no immediate eﬀects on the short-run equilib-
rium since it does not enter the short-run conditions PM, SR and SF in (23) or in the
log-linearized version (C.4). The subsidy simply raises VC proﬁts as in (C.16).
If the policy persists, it will eventually attract new managers to the industry to take
advantage of these rents. With given market tightness and the same aggregate demand
for VC, each individual VC fund receives less demand when more of them compete for
investments. Therefore, the demand curve for the ﬁnancial oﬀers per VC shifts down in
Figure 2, see the eﬀect of ˆ F>0 on SR in (C.4), while the supply curve reﬂecting the
investment condition SF of an individual VC is not aﬀected. Drawing the demand shift
shows that equilibrium market tightness relaxes. Despite of the fact that search intensity
and portfolio size also decline as in (C.8), the larger number of funds succeeds to ﬁnance
more start-up ﬁrms.17 A fraction p of them succeeds to introduce their product to the
market. With a larger number of mature ﬁrms, ˆ N>0, the product supply curve shifts
to the right in Figure 3. The excess supply of new goods erodes equilibrium venture
17The number of VC backed start-up ﬁrms is E = vf (θ)F and changes by ˆ E =ˆ v + ηˆ θ + ˆ F.U s i n g




31returns by ˆ x = −ζF ˆ F as computed in (C.10). The joint surplus thus falls and thereby
discourages eﬀorts and the success rate. The lower surplus partly destroys the returns
to search investments and impairs somewhat the incentives of entrepreneurs to pursue
seed investments and of VCs to search for investment opportunities. The net eﬀect of VC
entry is stated in
Proposition 5 (VC entry subsidy) (a) VC entry ˆ F>0 reduces venture returns,
eﬀort and advice, the success rate and joint surplus of VC backed ﬁrms, as well as search
intensity of VCs. Market tightness and portfolio size decline.
(b) Welfare declines on account of negative eﬀects on variety, scale, joint eﬀort, and (in
case of η>ξ ) market tightness.
Proof. (a) ˆ x<0 by (C.10), ˆ S<0 by (C.13), and ˆ v<0 by (C.8). A suﬃcient
condition for ˆ θ<0 and ˆ v +ηˆ θ<0, i.e. for market tightness and portfolio size to decline,
is ω>κ , see (C.8). Entry stops when search intensity is reduced to the extent given in
(C.16) which implies a larger number of VC funds as in (C.19). Some long-run eﬀects are
given in (C.16). (b) The welfare eﬀects are read form (24).
3.3 Basic Research and Research Grants
According to Becker and Hellmann (2002), the supply of high quality entrepreneurs with
new innovative ideas is a precondition for the development of a healthy VC sector. Uni-
versities and other research centers create technological spillovers which can be exploited
by the formation of new ﬁrms.18 The government could shift a part G of public spend-
ing to promote research areas of high commercial value. The human capital created at
universities helps people to invent new applications and thereby raises the probability of
18Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) show empirically that the human capital created by frontier research
around great universities was a principal determinant of the growth and location of the US biotechnology
industry. The conclude “This industry is a testament to the value of basic scientiﬁc research.” See
Audretsch et al. (2003) for a review of the literature and results for Germany.
32spinoﬀs. Start-up entrepreneurship can also be encouraged by complementary activities
such as entrepreneurial training. Somewhat simplistically, we assume that these expen-
ditures reduce the private cost of experimental research in the seed phase and thereby
encourages more researchers to attempt entrepreneurship with some initial seed invest-
ments. Given the need for external ﬁnancing as well as strategic business advice, the
demand for VC rises. As an alternative, the government might also consider encouraging
experimentation with new business ideas by simply handing out small research grants
zR. Such grants might be given subject to the requirement to produce a business plan,
irrespective of whether the entrepreneur succeeds to attract VC ﬁnance or not.
In our model, both initiatives reduce private research cost. In shifting down the cost
schedule in Figure 1, they raise the mass of agents who try entrepreneurship. The demand
for VC grows. In Figure 2, the demand schedule shifts up (not drawn). Since this policy
does not directly aﬀect the investment criterion of ﬁnanciers, the supply curve for VC
remains invariant. Market tigthness increases when more entrepreneurs ask for ﬁnance.
Accordingly, the VC’s probability to locate proﬁtable investments rises which strengthens
her incentives for search, leading to an increase in the supply of VC in terms of ﬁnancing
oﬀers. With each VC tending a larger portfolio vf (θ) of ﬁrms, more seed investments get
started as a VC backed ﬁrm, E = vf (θ)F, of which a fraction p matures to production
stage, N = pE. Consequently, market supply in Figure 3 shifts to the right. Equilibrium
venture returns decline as in (C.10) when more ﬁrms crowd the market.
The research subsidy does not directly aﬀect the joint surplus of a start-up ﬁrm.
However, since increased start-up activity spoils sales and proﬁts of individual ﬁrms, it
thereby retards entrepreneurial eﬀort and managerial support and erodes the joint surplus
i nt h es t a r t - u pp h a s e .T h i sn e g a t i v ef e e d b a c kf r o mt h em a r k e tw e a k e n st h ei n c e n t i v e sf o r
search eﬀort that were initially created by the research policy and dampens other reactions
as well. However, if the elasticity for variety demand µ is suﬃciently large, the erosion
of venture returns will not overturn the incentives for start-up activity created by the
research policy. With a large elasticity µ, the product demand curve in Figure 3 is ﬂat so
33that even a small reduction in sales x per brand creates a large demand for new products.
Consequently, a minor reduction of sales and proﬁts suﬃces to create new markets for the
extra start-ups resulting from a more active research policy. With this proﬁt destruction
eﬀect being small, it cannot overturn the incentives of VCs to search more intensively
for new investments when the research policy raises market tightness by stimulating seed
investments. Although lower venture returns erode the incentives for eﬀort and thereby
reduce the success rate and joint surplus from start-up ﬁrms, this negative eﬀect remains
small as well when the product demand curve is ﬂat.
In stimulating more seed investments by potential entrepreneurs, the policy contributes
to increased market tightness and thereby raises the VCs’ probability to attract invest-
ments. Larger company portfolios create VC rents which attract new managers to the
industry. As more start-ups get ﬁnanced, more ﬁrms will eventually mature to production
stage and crowd the market with new products. The reduction in venture returns is thus
magniﬁed in the long-run by the entry of VCs, see (A.22). Consequently, joint eﬀorts, the
success rate and joint surplus all shrink beyond the short-run eﬀect which impairs search
incentives. Entry continues until the short-run increase in VC search intensity is fully
reversed and VC rents are exhausted. When there is free entry of VCs in the long-run,
the number of VC backed ﬁrms in the market is larger but VCs are less engaged to sup-
port the portfolio companies with active managerial advice. In this sense, there is more
quantity but less quality of VC.
Proposition 6 (Research Policy) (a) In the short-run, research policy boosts the sup-
ply of new products N but erodes venture returns x.J o i n t e ﬀorts, the success rate and
surplus, e, a, p and S, fall. Market tightness θ, VC search intensity v, portfolio size vf (θ)
and VC rents Ω increase if the demand elasticity µ for variety is suﬃciently large.
(b) In the long-run, VC search intensity is back to its initial value (ˆ v =0 )b u tp o r t f o l i o
size increases with market tightness θ.V Ce n t r yi sp o s i t i v e ,ˆ F>0,v e n t u r er e t u r n sx and
thereby e, a, p and S fall while the number of mature ﬁrms N increases.
(c) Basic R&D spending G and small research grants zR both diminish consumer sur-
34plus by reducing (i) scale, (ii) variety, and (iii) joint eﬀorts. (iv) The increased market
tightness yields a positive welfare eﬀect if η>ξ , and a negative (zero) one if η<(=)ξ.
(v) Public R&D funds G directly boost welfare as long as the aggregate savings of private
research cost exceeds the opportunity costs of these funds, KG > 1.
Proof. (a) In the short-run, ˆ x<0 < ˆ N by (C.10). By (C.1), ˆ e, ˆ a and ˆ p fall in line
with ˆ x while ˆ S<0 is calculated in (C.13). By (C.14), search intensity increases despite of
t h en e g a t i v ei n ﬂuence of ˆ S<0 if µ is suﬃciently large. Since a large µ dampens the eﬀect
of a smaller surplus, market tightness and portfolio size similarly increase on account of
(C.8). VC rents increase with search intensity by (C.16). (b) Long-run eﬀects follow from
(C.16) and (C.22). (c) Noting ˆ x<0 < ˆ θ,t h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects follow from (24).
3.4 Tax Policy
Industry representatives cite the capital gains tax as the most important tax barrier
against VC investments. Policy makers have often called for tax breaks or even an entire
elimination of the capital gains tax to expand the VC industry and thereby stimulate
growth and innovation. In general, all business taxes on the proﬁts of start-up ﬁrms
and VC funds are relevant. To mimick the consequences of a tax break but nevertheless
avoid tedious tax base eﬀects, we start from an untaxed equilibrium and introduce a small
negative tax (i.e. a subsidy), ˆ t<0. To avoid any cost to the tax payer, this tax break is
ﬁnanced by a start-up tax ˆ tI > 0. Since entrepreneurs are wealth constrained, the start-
up tax is in fact shouldered by ﬁnanciers who must pay a larger price for their share in
the ﬁrm, see (9). Note that this tax policy initiative avoids handing out any net subsidy
to VC backed start-up ﬁrms. Will it nevertheless expand the industry? What are the
implications for the quantity and quality of VC ﬁnance, and for welfare?
To keep the proposal revenue neutral, the two instruments must be adjusted simulta-








= −tII. Starting from an untaxed position, reducing the capital gains
35tax requires an increase in the start-up tax equal to
I · ˆ t
I = −(pπ − I) · ˆ t. (26)
The tax cut directly boosts joint eﬀort and the success rate in (C.1). The start-up tax,
in contrast, has no direct impact on eﬀort since it is not related to performance. Both
instruments, however, aﬀect the joint surplus of a start-up. Imposing the ﬁscal budget
constraint (26) together with t = tI =0an IN = I in (C.3) yields, with ζSX > 1,
ˆ t<0 ⇒ ˆ S = −(ζSX − 1)
pπ
S
· ˆ t>0. (27)
Even though the policy involves no net subsidy to the project, the joint surplus increases
because it stimulates eﬀort and thereby oﬀsets the underinvestment problem. Since this
higher surplus is shared among VCs and entrepreneurs, it raises the returns to search.
Accordingly, VCs look more intensively for investments and more researchers decide for
an attempt at entrepreneurship. The demand and supply curves for VC in Figure 2 shift
up, implying a higher search intensity and market tightness (when entrepreneurial entry
is more elastic than VC search, ω>κ ). When VCs expand their company portfolios and
ﬁnance a larger number of start-ups, as ˆ S>0 implies in (C.8), and when the success rate
among these start-up ﬁrms is higher on account of increased eﬀort, more ﬁrms mature
to production stage and succeed to introduce new goods. The product supply curve
in Figure 3 shifts to the right, yielding ˆ x<0 < ˆ N. The policy initiative thus erodes
equilibrium venture returns. The formal solution in (C.10) takes account of the fact that
an erosion of venture returns negatively feeds back on the incentives to expend eﬀort in
earlier stages of the VC cycle. Substituting (26) into (C.10) yields the equilibrium impact
of the self-ﬁnanced tax cut:
ˆ x =
h








ˆ t<0, ˆ N = −µˆ x>0,












When ﬁrms in their mature stage are less eﬀective in generating sales and proﬁts,
ˆ x<0, entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers must expect a smaller joint surplus in the start-up
36phase. After taking account of this negative feedback, the net eﬀect is calculated from
(C.13). Imposing the policy restriction (26) yields
ˆ S = −




· ˆ t>0. (29)
T h en e g a t i v ef e e d b a c ke ﬀect from lower venture returns is small when the demand schedule
in Figure 3 is ﬂat, i.e. when the demand elasticity µ is large. Equilibrium venture returns
then decline by a relatively minor amount so that the direct eﬀect of the tax cut on
joint surplus remains dominant.19 VCs share in this larger surplus and will search more
intensively to expand their company portfolios. VC rents accordingly increase in the
short-run which eventually attracts more managers to set up new VC funds. This relaxes
the scarce managerial resource in the long-run. We ﬁnd the following results:
Proposition 7 (Self-ﬁnanced Tax Cut) (a) In the short-run, the self-ﬁnanced tax cut
given in (26) boosts the supply of new products N but erodes venture returns x.E ﬀorts
and the success rate, e, a,a n dp, all increase. Joint surplus increases if µ is large. Market
tightness θ (if ω>κand µ large), VC search intensity v, portfolio size vf (θ) and VC
rents Ω increase in proportion to the joint surplus.
(b) In the long-run, VC search intensity is back to its initial value (ˆ v =0 ). VC entry is
positive, ˆ F>0. The tax cut raises joint surplus but shrinks portfolio size together with
market tightness θ.V e n t u r er e t u r n sx decline but the tax cut boosts eﬀorts and the success
rate, e, a, p. The number of mature ﬁrms N increases.
(c) The tax cut (i) diminishes welfare on account of a negative scale eﬀect but (ii) raises
welfare due to a positive variety eﬀect and (iii) by stimulating joint eﬀorts. These eﬀects
are qualitatively the same in the short- and long-run. (iv) The short-run increase in
market tightness (if ω>κand µ large) yields a welfare gain if η>ξ ,a n dal o s si fη<ξ .
In the long-run, market tightness relaxes if µ is relatively large, yielding a welfare loss if
η>ξ ,a n dag a i ni fη<ξ .




S ˆ t.S i n c e ∆X/µ → 1 for µ →∞by (C.11), the eﬀect of the policy
reduces to ˆ S = −(ζSX − 1)
pπ
S ˆ t for very large µ which is the direct eﬀect noted in (27).
37Proof. (a) In the short-run, ˆ x<0 < ˆ N and ˆ x − ˆ t>0 by (28). This raises eﬀorts
and the success rate as in (C.1) while ˆ S>0 is calculated in (29) for µ suﬃciently large.
The changes in θ, v, vf (θ) and Ω follow from (C.8) and (C.16). (b) Free entry in the
long-run results in ˆ v =0and ˆ F>0 by (C.16) and (C.23) where the latter eﬀect hinges on
the demand elasticity being large. Although venture returns decline, see (C.24), the tax
cut raises joint surplus relative to the initial equilibrium, consistent with positive entry,
ˆ F>0 ⇒ ˆ S>0 and ˆ θ<0, see (C.17). The tax cut enhances eﬀorts and boosts the
success rate as in (C.1) sind ˆ x−ˆ t>0 by (28). Given smaller sales per ﬁrm, ˆ x<0,m a r k e t
demand supports a larger number of mature ﬁr m s ,s e eP Mi n( C . 4 ) . ( c )T h ew e l f a r e
eﬀects follow from (24) after substituting ˆ x<0, ˆ x − ˆ t>0 and ˆ θ.
The self-ﬁnanced tax cut fails to achieve unambiguous welfare gains, even if one ex-
cludes search distortions (η = ξ). Since it expands the supply of mature ﬁrms, it reduces
sales per ﬁrm and thereby produces a negative scale eﬀect. Smaller demand per variety
is detrimental since demand is already repressed due to mark-up pricing. The scale ef-
fect subtracts from the otherwise positive welfare eﬀects of the tax cut that result from
stimulating private eﬀort and joint surplus per project, and from the extra product va-
riety oﬀered by new ﬁrms. An output subsidy, in contrast, subsidizes consumer prices
and thereby creates extra demand. Consequently, sales per ﬁrm and product variety can
expand at the same time, allowing for gains from variety and scale. Higher sales mean
higher venture returns which strengthen the incentives for private eﬀort. Except possibly
for the search distortions, an output subsidy yields welfare gains on all fronts. A targeted
output subsidy for innovative ﬁr m si st h u ss u p e r i o rt oat a xc u t ,s e eT a b l e2 .
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper proposed a rich model of the venture capital industry. It emphasizes the
need for an active research environment as an important precondition for the supply of
high quality entrepreneurs and the contribution of new ﬁrms to innovation. The supply of
38entrepreneurs depends on the willingness of inventive persons to give up alternative career
opportunities. Start-up entrepreneurs are often commercially inexperienced and thus need
informed capital that not only provides ﬁnance but also managerial support. This model
of venture capital backed start-up ﬁrms is embedded in a model of industry equilibrium
where a downward sloping demand curve for innovative goods determines the overall
size of the product market. The inelastic entry and search activities of entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists lead to an endogenously determined market tightness in venture
capital ﬁnance. The ﬁrst activity of entrepreneurs is a seed investment in experimental
research leading to a business plan that can be presented to a venture capitalist who
could provide the required funds and help with strategic business advice. The paper is
unique in discussing not only inelastic supply of entrepreneurs but also inelastic supply of
venture capital which consists of an optimally determined portfolio size of a ﬁxed number
of venture capitalists in the short-run and an endogenously explained number of venture
capital funds in the long-run.
Based on this structural model of the venture capital industry, we have considered a
rich menu of policy instruments that are able to inﬂuence the evolution of the industry.
Interestingly, some of the popular policy measures often proposed by governments receive
no support in this model. For example, research grants to encourage fresh entrepreneurs,
or capital subsidies to reduce the cost of start-up investment, succeed to expand the VC
sector. However, they do not help with mark-up pricing and they discourage private eﬀort
rather than promote it as is required in a situation of double moral hazard. Similarly,
spending on basic research alone is not successful in addressing output market distortions
or the problem of double moral hazard, although it will yield welfare gains if the cost
reductions to private research in the seed phase exceed the opportunity costs of these
funds. Cutting capital gains taxes combined with a tax (rather than a subsidy) on start-
up capital spending is a useful policy to sharpen incentives for entrepreneurial eﬀort and
VC support. This initiative can be made self-ﬁnancing and does not yield any net subsidy
to VC backed ﬁrms. It is thus designed not to obtain more, but more successful start-up
ﬁrms. The reduced failure rate among start-ups leads to more mature ﬁrms introducing
39new goods. An output subsidy to mature ﬁrms is seen to be even more favorable, however,
and yields multiple dividends. It not only shifts the scale and variety of new ﬁrms in the
right direction but also sharpens incentives for joint eﬀort.
Appendix
AP r o ﬁt Sharing and Joint Eﬀort
(a) Eﬀort Stage: Appendix A proves proposition 1. Linearizing the incentive con-
straints (11) allows to uncover the comparative static eﬀects on eﬀorts. The hat notation
denotes relative changes such as ˆ a = da/a. Tax rates, however, can be zero in the initial
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etc. The linearized reaction functions are20
ICE :( 1 −  )ˆ e = αˆ a +ˆ s +ˆ π − ˆ tE,
ICF :( 1 − α)ˆ a =  ˆ e − s
1−sˆ s +ˆ π − ˆ tF.
(A.1)
Solving (A.1) and noting (A.6) below yields the comparative static eﬀects as in part (a),
ˆ a = 1
1− −α
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ˆ π − s− 
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ˆ e = 1
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ˆ p = 1
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(b) Contract Stage: Anticipating eﬀort choice, bargaining ﬁnds the optimal contract
s and B.A g e n t sﬁrst agree on a share s to maximize joint surplus and then bargain over
B to distribute it. The Pareto eﬃcient share follows from
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pπ =0 . (A.4)
20By (8), we have ˆ p = εˆ e + αˆ a, ˆ pe = −(1 − ε)ˆ e + αˆ a,a n dˆ pa = εˆ e − (1 − α)ˆ a.
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Using epe =  p and apa = αp from (8), noting the elasticities in (A.2), and canceling all









(1 − α)(s −  )
s
=0 . (A.5)
The second order condition is also satisﬁed, dS1
ds < 0. (A.5) and (8) imply
1 − s − α>0,s −  >0. (A.6)
Both terms must be of the same sign to satisfy (A.5). Adding up yields 1 >α+   in line
with (8). If both terms were negative, (8) would be violated. Condition (A.6) ensures
that a higher s raises the entrepreneur’s eﬀort but reduces managerial eﬀort in (A.2).
The diﬀerential of (A.5) shows how taxes aﬀect the proﬁt share. Using S2 ≡− dS1
ds > 0
ˆ s = −
¡
1 − tE¢
(1 −  )(1− s − α)









Au n i f o r mt a xh a sn oe ﬀect on optimal proﬁt sharing, ˆ s = −S1/(sS2) · ˆ t =0on ac-
count of (A.5). The tax cancels from both sides of the optimality condition. In this
case, we can explicitely solve for the optimal proﬁt share. From S1 =0 ,w eo b t a i n
(1 −  )sα =( 1 − s)[sα +( 1− s − α) ].E x a n d b y +sα  − sα  and write the square
bracket as [(1 −  )sα +( 1− s)(1− α) ].W eg e t(1 −  )αs2 =( 1− s)




(1 − α) ·  
α · (1 −  )
. (A.8)
BI n c o m e a n d W e l f a r e
Appendix B derives aggregate income and welfare. The entire population splits into M
agents endowed with managerial skills who can either be workers or VCs, while 1 − M
are endowed with variable entrepreneurial research skills. Out of the latter group, a
part 1 − M − R directly opts for employment in the old economy, and a part R tries
entrepreneurship in pursuing a seed investment. Only E of them succeed to attract VC
41and start a ﬁrm while the R−E unsuccessful ones turn back to employment, after having
sunk a research eﬀort and consumed a lump-sum research subsidy or grant zR.A l la g e n t s
are subject to a per capita lump-sum tax T. Incomes of these diﬀerent groups are
1 − M − R : w − T, M − F : w − T,
E : Y E + zR − T, F : vf (θ)Y F + zF − T,
R − E : w + zR − T.
(B.1)
Taking account of diﬀerent average incomes, the government budget constraint is
T + tE [spπ + B]E + tF £






= G + zXqxN + zFF + zRR.
(B.2)
To compute aggregate income, multiply the income terms in (B.1) with the size of the
population groups and add up. Using (9), (B.2), π =
¡
1+zX¢
qx−x in (6) and N = pE
in (20) yields, after some manipulations,
Y = w +[ ( q − 1)xp − I − w]E − wF − G. (B.3)
Equate spending Y = VD+ Z with aggregate income in (B.3). Spending on innovative
goods is VD= xDqN, where the superscript indicates the demand side as in (2). The
wage rate is w =1 , manufacturing supply L =1− E − F by (13), and N = pE by (20).
The aggregate income spending identity thus implies Walras’ Law which says that valued
excess demands sum up to zero,
¡
x − xD¢
N · q +( L − IE− xN − G − Z)=0 .D e m a n d
for traditional goods stems from consumer demand Z, government R&D spending G,
capital goods spending of E start-ups and intermediate inputs of N = pE mature ﬁrms
in the innovative sector. By Walras’ Law, market clearing for innovative goods, x = xD,
implies market clearing for traditional goods.
Indirect utility in (5), Ui∗ = yi−li+C, depends on income, eﬀort costs, and consumer
surplus. Aggregate income is given in (B.3). Eﬀort costs consist of productive eﬀorts
e and a a n ds e a r c he ﬀorts δ and ki by VCs and entrepreneurs, giving a total cost of
γaE + δF by VCs and βeE + K, K =
R R
0 kidi, by entrepreneurs. Using (B.3) together
42with w =1and (13), we have
U∗ = C (V )+1+S∗E − (δ(v)+1 )F − K − G,
S∗ =( q − 1)xp − βe− γa− I − 1.
(B.4)
Note that S∗ is the social surplus from a new start-up, summing up the surplus derived
by the VC, the entrepreneur and the government. This social surplus is diﬀerent from the
private one as deﬁned in (10).21
C Comparative Statics
C.1 Preliminaries
This appendix computes the log-linearized form of the system in (23) and proves the
results of section 3. In all policy scenarios, we restrict attention to a uniform capital
gains tax t = tE = tF a n dt oz e r oe n t r ys u b s i d i e szR = zF =0in the initial equilibrium.
Following the discussion in section 2.6, we must ﬁrst relate joint surplus and the survival
rate to sales of mature ﬁrms which stands for proﬁts and thereby venture returns, ˆ π =ˆ x.
Given uniform capital gains taxes, the proﬁt share remains ﬁxed by (A.8), i.e. ˆ s =0 .
Therefore, eﬀorts in (A.2) change proportionately and aﬀect the ﬁrm’s success rate by
ˆ e =ˆ a =
1
1 −   − α
¡
ˆ x − ˆ t
¢
, ˆ p = ζPX ·
¡
ˆ x − ˆ t
¢
,ζ PX ≡
  + α
1 −   − α
. (C.1)







− γa− βe− 1 and changes as
dS =( 1 − t)
£
pπ · ˆ x −
¡
1+tI¢
I · ˆ tI¤








+[(1− t)πpa − γ]da +[ ( 1− t)πpe − β]de.
(C.2)
Replace marginal eﬀort costs β and γ by (11) and note epe/p =   and apa/p = α by (8).
The second line emerges as (1 − t)pπ [sαˆ a +( 1− s) ˆ e]. Substituting the elasticities into
21One may check that the social surplus results by adding net expected tax revenue per project in (10),
S∗ = S + tE [spπ + B]+tF £






43(C.2) shows how joint surplus relates to venture returns (i.e. sales) x and taxes,
ˆ S =
(1−t)pπ·ζSX
S · ˆ x − IN
S · ˆ tI −
(1−t)pπ·ζSX−IN
S · ˆ t,
ζSX ≡
1−s −(1−s)α





The log-linearized form of (23) becomes (use ˆ q = −ˆ zX in PM):
PM : −µˆ x + µλˆ zX =ˆ p + ηˆ θ +ˆ v + ˆ F,
SR : ˆ S − (1 − η)ˆ θ = κ ·
³




ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´
,
SF : ˆ S + ηˆ θ = ωˆ v,
FE: ˆ Ω = ˆ S + ηˆ θ +ˆ v −
(1+ω)δ
1+δ ˆ v + 1
1+δˆ zF =0 .
(C.4)
In the condition SR for seed investments, we assume zR =0prior to the shock and note
that ˜ ξ = ξ remains constant when capital gains taxes are uniform. Linearization of SR
thus yields ˆ k −(1/k)ˆ zR = ˆ S + ˆ f −ˆ θ.U s i n g( 1 5 ) ,ˆ k = κ ˆ R− ˆ G, and noting ˆ R = ˆ θ +ˆ v + ˆ F
gives the result for SR. Next, the condition SF results upon using the constant elasticity
f o r mn o t e di n( 1 8 ) ,w h e r evδ
00/δ
0 = ω and vδ
0/δ =1+ω, giving ˆ δ
0
= ωˆ v. Finally, the free
entry condition FE is evaluated at zF =0and Ω =0 , implying (1 − ξ)Sf (θ)v = δ +1 .
Deﬁning ˆ Ω ≡ dΩ/(δ +1 )and using vδ
0/δ =1+ω, gives the last result in (C.4).
To prepare the welfare evaluation, one needs the derivatives of the welfare measure in
(B.4). To this end, we obtain an alternative expression for aggregate welfare by substi-
tuting consumer surplus (5) and using VD= Nqx and K (R,G)=
R R
0 k(i,G)di,
U∗ =1 + u(D) − xp(e,a)E − (βe+ γa+ I +1 )E − (1 + δ(v))F − K − G,
D = Nρx, V = N1−ρq, N = p(e,a)E, E = f (θ)vF, θ = R/(vF).
(C.5)
For convenience, we repeat the relevant relationsships showing how the composite good
D and the number E of start-ups and N of mature ﬁrms depend on other variables. Take
44the derivatives with respect to x, e, a, v; R, F, G and use u0 (D)=V = N1−ρq:
(a) ∂U∗/∂x =( q − 1)N,
(b) ∂U∗/∂e =[ ( qρ− 1)xpe − β]E,
(c) ∂U∗/∂a =[ ( qρ− 1)xpa − γ]E,
(d) ∂U∗/∂v = S∗ · ∂E/∂v− δ
0 (v)F,
(e) ∂U∗/∂R = S∗ · ∂E/∂R− k(R,G),
(f) ∂U∗/∂F = S∗ · ∂E/∂F − δ(v) − 1,
(g) ∂U∗/∂G = KG − 1,K G ≡−
R R
0 kG(i,G)di,
(h) S∗ =( qρ− 1)xp − βe− γa− I − 1.
(C.6)
After some manipulations, these derivatives yield the welfare diﬀerential
dU∗ =( KG − 1)G · ˆ G +( q − 1)xN · ˆ x +( q − 1)ρxN · ˆ p
+[ 1 − (1 − t)s]πN · ˆ e +[ 1− (1 − t)(1− s)]πNα· ˆ a
+[ ηS∗ − ξS]
f(θ)
θ R · ˆ R +[ ( 1− η)S∗ − (1 − ξ)S]E ·
³




The third to ﬁfth terms follow after expanding qρ−1=( q − 1)ρ+ρ−1 in (C.6.b,c), using
π =( ρ − 1)x,r e p l a c i n ge ﬀort costs β,γ from (11) and noting epe =  p and apa = αp as
well as ˆ p =  ˆ e + αˆ a and N = pE. I nt h et h i r dl i n e ,t h eﬁrst term follows from (C.6.e)
upon substituting k = Sξf/θ from (17) and dE/dR = f0 and using (15). The coeﬃcient
of ˆ v similarly derives from (C.6.d) upon substituting δ
0 from (19). Finally, the eﬀect of
ˆ F relies on the assumption that the initial equilibrium is one with zero proﬁts and a zero
entry subsidy, Ω =0and zF =0 ,s ot h a t(1 − ξ)S · f (θ)v = δ +1 . The wedges in the
third line relate to matching externalities that arise whenever the matching productivity
of each side as measured by the elasticity η is not well aligned with its bargaining power
(ξ 6= η) and the social surplus from a match is diﬀerent from the private surplus (S 6= S∗).
However, S = S∗ in the untaxed laissez-faire equilibrium, as was mentioned in the context
of (B.4).
45C.2 Short-Run Equilibrium
The comparative statics of the short-run equilibrium is deﬁned by PM, SR and SF in
(C.4). The number of VCs is ﬁxed but they may ﬁnance and advise a variable number
of portfolio companies. To prepare for long-run results, it is insightful to consider also
t h ei m p a c to fa ne x o g e n o u se n t r y ˆ F of VCs. The solution ﬁrst solves for the intersection
θ(x) and v(x) of the supply and demand curves for VC deﬁned by the search conditions
SR and SF, taking venture returns x as given. Figure 2 illustrates. The next step solves
the product market condition PM to obtain equilibrium returns x. With joint surplus
uniquely related to venture returns by (C.3), VC market equilibrium yields
ˆ θ = 1
∆S
h
(ω − κ) ˆ S + ω
³





ˆ v = 1
∆S
h
(1 + κ) ˆ S + η
³





ηˆ θ +ˆ v = 1
∆S
h
(1 + κ +( ω − κ)η) ˆ S +( 1+ω)η
³
ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR − κ ˆ F
´i
,
∆S ≡ (1 − η + κ)ω + κη > 0.
(C.8)
We largely focus on the case ω>κwhere the elasticity ω of marginal search cost with
respect to search intensity of VCs exceeds the elasticity κ of see investment cost k with
respect to entrepreneurial entry. This is justiﬁed by the limit case of perfectly elastic
supply of entrepreneurs where κ =0and entry cost is the same for the entire population
such that k = k0/G in (16). With entrepreneurial entry being more elastic than VC
supply, an increase in the joint surplus of start-up ﬁrms attracts relatively more seed
investments and creates more demand for VC as compared to additional ﬁnancing oﬀers
v. The market for VC thus becomes increasingly tight and θ = R/vF increases as in
(C.8). The third line shows that VC portfolio size vf (θ) expands when projects become
more proﬁtable on account of a higher joint surplus.
At this stage, we know how venture returns or proﬁts, as implied by sales x,a ﬀect
eﬀorts and the success rate, joint surplus, market tightness and VC search intensity. Using
(C.1,3,8) in condition PM in (C.4), ˆ N =ˆ p + ηˆ θ +ˆ v + ˆ F,o n eﬁnds how venture returns

































This equation deﬁnes, in log-linearized form, an upward sloping supply curve of new
g o o d s . T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fP Mi n( C . 4 )s t a t e st h ed e m a n dc u r v ef o rp r o d u c tv a r i e t y ,
ˆ N = −µˆ x + µλˆ zX. Figure 3 illustrates. The intersection yields scale and variety of
innovative goods or, equivalently, venture returns and the number of mature ﬁrms in
product market equilibrium. Formally,
ˆ x = ζtˆ t + ζIˆ t
I + ζxˆ z
X − ζG
³




− ζF ˆ F, ˆ N = −µˆ x + µλˆ z
X. (C.10)
All ζ-coeﬃcients are deﬁned positive. The term ∆X stands for the elasticity of excess
demand for variety with respect to venture returns,

























To see how the tax aﬀects eﬀorts in (C.1), one requires ˆ x − ˆ t =( ζt − 1)ˆ t,w h e r e










A key result is the policy impact on VC search intensity which importantly depends on
joint surplus. Replacing ˆ x in (C.3) by (C.10) yields











ζxˆ zX − ζG
³
ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´











S which follows from some manipula-
tions after substituting ζI and using ∆X. Further, the coeﬃcient for ˆ t is
(ζt−1)(1−t)pπ·ζSX+IN
S
and emerges as in (C.12) upon substitution of ζt−1 and further manipulations using ∆X.
The tax rate reduces joint surplus if the elasticity µ of variety demand is large.
47Using ˆ S in (C.8), we ﬁnd that the only ambiguous eﬀect on search intensity comes
from ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR. Substitute ζG and use ∆X and ∆S and get, after some manipulations,
ˆ v = 1
∆S
h
(1 + κ) ˆ S + η
³




















(1 + ω) ˆ S +( ω + η)
³








To link the short and long-run eﬀects, one must show ﬁrst how policy shocks create rents
Ω on VC investing for a given number of VCs F and, second, how entry ˆ F eliminates rents
to determine a long-run number of VCs (free entry). Substituting SF in FE in (C.4), one





(1 + ω)ˆ v +ˆ z
F¤





If a policy raises search intensity it creates rents and thereby eventually attracts more
VCs, ˆ F>0. As entry continues, rents get eroded until no further entry is proﬁtable. We
now show that an exogenous increase in F reduces individual search intensity and short-
run rents to VC investing. Consider (C.4). For any given market tightness and search
intensity, the supply curve for VC shifts to the right since more VCs are able to ﬁnance
more ﬁrms. As Figure 2 indicates, market tightness and equilibrium search intensity both
decline to equilibrate the market for VC, see (C.8). The implied reduction in portfolio size
retards the initial supply expansion and stops the decline in venture returns. On net, VC
entry boosts the number of mature ﬁrms and thereby erodes venture returns by ˆ x = −ζF ˆ F
as in (C.10). Figure 3 illustrates. Since both eﬀects ˆ F>0 > ˆ S reduce search intensity, we
have shown that VC entry reduces rents in (C.16). If a policy boosts search intensity and
VC rents in the short-run, it triggers entry of VCs. Increasing competition reduces the
returns to search and discourages new investments until rents are ﬁnally exhausted and
48the long-run search intensity attains the value in (C.16). Quite intuitively, a higher entry
subsidy reduces the net opportunity cost 1 − zF of a VC such that a smaller portfolio is
required to break even. Search intensity is reduced in the long-run.
Next, the investment conditions determine market tightness and joint surplus of start-
ups although the number of VCs is not yet known and must be inferred from the product
market condition. Solving SR and SF in (C.4) in terms of ˆ v yields the solution for the
required surplus and market tightness,
ˆ θ = 1
1+κ
h³
ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´















By (C.3), to sustain this surplus, the necessary venture returns must amount to
























Now get ˆ F from product market condition, µλˆ zX =( µ + ζPX)ˆ x + ηˆ θ +ˆ v + ˆ F − ζPXˆ t,
after substituting the results for ˆ θ and ˆ x:
∇F · ˆ F = µλ · ˆ zX −
(µ+ζPX)IN
(1−t)pπ·ζSX · ˆ tI
−
µ[(1−t)pπ·ζSX−IN]−ζPXIN



























At ﬁrst sight, the coeﬃcients of ˆ t and ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR are ambiguous which is a mirror image
of the short-run ambiguity in search intensity and VC rents, see (C.13-14). The short-run
eﬀect of the tax rate on search intensity and VC rents and, thereby, on long-run VC entry
is negative if the demand elasticity µ of new goods with respect to venture returns x is
large. This condition is met if the demand elasticity of the ﬁnal good is large but satisﬁes
λ<σ , see (4).22 If µ is suﬃciently large, the coeﬃcient of ˆ G is positive as well so that the
tax reduces VC entry while more R&D spending and research grants for seed investments
raise it in the long-run.
22Note that µ>0 requires λ<σwhere the upper bound σ>1.I fλ → σ from below, µ →∞ .
49Output Subsidy: Setting ˆ v =0as in (C.16) and taking the product market clearing
number of VCs from (C.19), ˆ F =
µλ
∇F ˆ zX > 0, one derives from (C.17-18)
ˆ S =
κη




ˆ θ = − κ
1+κ ˆ F<0, ˆ E = ˆ θ +ˆ v + ˆ F = 1
1+κ ˆ F>0.
(C.20)
Subsidizing VC Entry: The ﬁr s tl i n eb e l o wr e s u l t sf r o m( C . 1 6 )a n d( C . 1 9 ) . T h e
second is shown after some manipulations by substituting (C.19) into (C.17). The eﬀect
on ˆ x follows from inverting (C.3) and noting the impact on ˆ S. L a s t l y ,t h ei m p a c to nˆ θ
follows from (C.8) and the signs of ˆ S and ˆ F:
ˆ v = − 1











ˆ S = 1
1+κ
h





ˆ x = S
(1−t)pπ·ζSX
ˆ S<0, ˆ N = −µˆ x>0, ˆ θ = 1
∆S
h




Research Policy: The ﬁrst line results from (C.16) and (C.19), with ˆ F>0 for µ large.
T h es q u a r eb r a c k e t si n( C . 1 4 )a n d( C . 1 9 )a r ei d e n t i c a ls ot h a tt h es i g no ft h es h o r t - r u n
eﬀect on ˆ v is the same as the sign of the long-run eﬀect on VC entry ˆ F. Substituting
ˆ F from the ﬁr s tl i n eo f( C . 2 2 )a n du s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of ∇F, one obtains after some
manipulations ˆ G+k−1ˆ zR−κ ˆ F =
³
ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´
/∇F. Using this result in (C.17-18) yields
the second and third lines where ˆ N simply reﬂects the product demand curve:




ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´
≷ 0,







ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´
< 0, ˆ N = −µˆ x>0,






ˆ G + k−1ˆ zR
´









Self-ﬁnanced Tax Cut: Free entry implies ˆ v =0 . Starting from an untaxed equilib-
rium and imposing the budget restriction I · ˆ tI = −(pπ − I) · ˆ t on (C.19), one gets
ˆ F = −
[(ζSX − 1)µ − ζPX]
ζSX∇F
· ˆ t>0. (C.23)
Again, the number of VCs increases if the demand elasticity µ is large enough. Since
ˆ v =0 , entry of VCs reduces market tightness and raises joint surplus in the long-run, see




ζSX · ˆ t + S
pπζSX
κη




ˆ x − ˆ t = −1
ζSX · ˆ t + S
pπζSX
κη
1+κ · ˆ F>0.
(C.24)
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